In fact, the last two years have been particularly eventful. Law and Justice, the ruling party in Poland, announced and implemented controversial reforms of the Polish Supreme Court and the National Council of the Judiciary. 7 The Court of Justice stepped boldly into the debate in the "Portuguese Judges" case (Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses), when it held for the first time that domestic judicial design is within its purview. 8 Soon after the "Portuguese Judges" case, the Court of Justice engaged with the abovementioned Polish judicial reforms -it decided the Celmer case 9 and ordered Poland to suspend the application of the provisions relating to the lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges. 10 The ECtHR did not lag behind. While it has engaged with domestic judicial design for much longer 11 than the CJEU, its two recent Grand Chamber judgments in Therefore, we should care as well. If we want to prevent (or at least slow down) the capture of the judiciary by authoritarian leaders and limit the damage caused by populist regimes, we need to know how judicial self--governance bodies work, why they were established, what effects they have brought about, why they are challenged, and where the potential channels of politicization of the judiciary via these bodies lie. The fact that the state of judicial (self--)governance is in constant flux in many jurisdictions presents a big challenge for this special issue, but each contribution is well embedded in the broader societal and historical context, and thus this special issue will remain a key reference for quite some time. This article of course cannot do justice to the richness of 19 contributions to this special issue. It merely reflects on some common themes regarding the forms, rationales, and effects of judicial self--governance in Europe. Along the way, it identifies emerging trends and suggests avenues for further research. The argument of this article is three--fold. First, it argues that it is high time to look beyond judicial councils and to study the role of judges in governance of the judiciary holistically. This requires focusing on de facto judicial self--governance, the identification of other actors within the judiciary who may engage in judicial governance (such as judicial appointment commissions, promotion committees, court presidents and disciplinary panels), and broadening the studied spheres of judicial self--governance. Second, it is necessary to take into account the liquid nature of judicial self--governance and its responsiveness to political, social, and cultural changes. Finally, it is crucial to acknowledge that the rise of judicial self--governance is not necessarily a panacea, as it may lead to political contestation and the creation of new channels of politicization of the judiciary. In order to make sense of these arguments, it is also important to clarify the scope of this special issue. It deliberately adopts a broad definition of judicial self--governance. 21 For the purposes of this special issue, "judicial self--governance body" includes any institution (in which a judge or judges sit) that has some powers regarding court administration and/or judicial careers. More precisely, a "judicial self--governance body" is a body with at least one judge whose primary function, entrenched in a legal norm, is to (a) decide about issues regarding court administration and/or the career of a judge, and/or (b) advise those who decide about such issues. This definition thus includes not only judicial councils, but also court presidents, the Court Service, specialized domestic judicial appointment commissions, as well as the Article 255 TFEU Panel for the selection of Court of Justice judges and the Committee of Ministers (CM) Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as Judge to the ECtHR. 22 At the same time, owing to limited space this special issue focuses only on judicial self--governance regarding ordinary courts and ordinary judges, and leaves aside administrative and special tribunals, specialized constitutional courts, 23 and public prosecutors. 24 21 Note that, on reflection, I simply prefer the term governance to government as the former is better for studying judiciaries beyond the state and signifies a change in the meaning of judicial self--government, referring to new processes of governing the judiciary, changed conditions of ordered rule, and new methods by which society is governed. Due to the limited space, I cannot engage with this conceptual debate here. Importantly, I did not impose this view on the contributors to this special issue (some of them use judicial self--governance, while others prefer judicial self--government or even use both terms). Please keep this in mind when reading this special issue. 22 See Part C for further details. 23 I am aware that judicial self--governance at these courts raises different issues and often differs significantly from the judicial self--governance of ordinary courts. But these differences can also be abused, see the creation of the new parallel system of specialized administrative courts in Hungary (analyzed by Novak & Kingsley, supra note 4). 24 Even though, as you will see below, especially the Mediterranean jurisdictions consider prosecutors on par with judges and often involve both groups in joint judicial self--governance bodies. Such a broad definition has several advantages. 25 However, I am also aware that our broad definition of "judicial self--governance body" adopts a particular take on several contested issues. It is for instance clear that our definition treats judicial self--governance as a matter of degree rather than a binary variable. Therefore, for us it is still judicial self--governance when judges have parity 26 on judicial self--governance bodies (such as judicial councils) or are even in the minority, 27 when prosecutors sit on judicial self--governance bodies as well, 28 when a lay member or the head of state presides over the judicial self--governance body, 29 when judges themselves do not elect judicial members to the judicial self--governance body and judicial members are thus not truly "representatives" of judges, 30 when judicial self--governance is dominated by court presidents at the expense of rank--and--file judges, 31 and when senior judges (or apex court judges) have the upper hand on the judicial self--governance body and thus this body does not proportionally represent all tiers of the judiciary. More controversially, even if judges from other jurisdictions sit on the judicial self--governance body, we still treat it as a judicial self--governance body. This is the case of the ECtHR and the CJEU because, technically speaking, active CJEU judges do not sit on the Article 255 TFEU Panel. Similarly, the relevant resolution of the Committee of Ministers makes clear that only former international judges can sit on the CM Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as Judge to the ECtHR. 32 Hence, one may argue that these two panels are not examples of "judicial self--governance". However, there is a fine line between "judicial self--governance" and "judicial governance" at the ECtHR and the 25 See Part C. 26 See e.g. judicial councils in the Netherlands and the de iure also in Slovakia. CJEU. Both expert panels often include former ECtHR and CJEU judges and other "friends" of these two courts. Moreover, the CJEU's and ECtHR's presidents have a major say in the composition of these two panels. The CJEU President selects the majority of the members of the Article 255 TFEU panel and the ECtHR President selects all the members of the CM Panel. Therefore, we include these two bodies in our analysis as well. Not everyone agrees 33 with this approach, but we at least know on what we disagree. 34 This article will proceed as follows. Part B situates the special issue in the existing literature, explains its structure, and briefly summarizes individual contributions. Part C maps the common themes that have emerged from the contributions to this special issue and problematizes the forms of judicial self--governance in Europe. Part D analyzes the rationales behind the rise and fall of judicial self--governance in Europe. Part E zeroes in on the effects of judicial self--governance on public confidence in courts, judicial independence and accountability, and on transparency and legitimacy of the judiciary. Part F concludes.
B. Setting the Scene
The power of courts has increased worldwide at an unprecedented pace. At the same time, there has been a parallel rise in judicial self--governance. In Europe, this has happened on both national and supranational levels. 47 While the unprecedented rise of the decision--making power of courts has been exhaustively addressed in the literature, the increasing power of judges in selecting their peers and in court administration more generally has attracted far less attention so far. This is so despite the fact that the rise of judicial councils and other judicial self--governance bodies is difficult to overlook. The huge policy implications of this phenomenon are also beyond doubt, as evidenced by a plethora of European policymaking bodies involved in this area --not only the Legal scholars have somewhat lagged behind these developments. To be sure, the literature on judicial independence 49 and judicial reforms 50 more generally has often touched upon judicial self--governance issues. Another important strand of research concerning the selection of judges has also acknowledged a growing role of judges in selecting their peers. 51 There is also a small but burgeoning scholarly literature on judicial councils, 52 and an even smaller set of studies on the role of Chief Justices and court presidents more generally. 53 However, a holistic view of judicial self--governance on the domestic level has been missing. There is even less on judicial self--governance at supranational and international courts, despite the fact that these courts have far more autonomy in court administration, given the fact that they adopt their statutes by themselves and that they do not face a powerful executive and legislature. that this Panel could be seen "as a germ of a council of judiciary within the Union" 54 or "some embryonic form of unintended judicial self--government", 55 or at least suggest that there is the potential for a "subtle move" in the direction of judicial self--governance. 56 Marc van der Woude's recent proposal goes even further and proposes a European Council of the Judiciary. 57 However, EU law scholars rarely engage with the role of CJEU President and other forms of judicial self--governance. The same applies to the ECtHR 58 and other international courts. 59 There are some studies on the selection of their judges, 60 but not much beyond that. 61 In sum, despite the growing body of literature, there are still very few in--depth studies on judicial self--governance bodies and their interaction with other actors. Moreover, from the conceptual point of view, the current scholarly debate zeroes in on the impact of strong judicial councils advocated by the EU and the Council of Europe in Central and Eastern Europe, and to a great extent overlooks other forms of judicial self--governance such as a moderate judicial council in the Netherlands and the Court Service in Ireland. The rise of judicial self--governance within the traditional executive systems of court administration in Germany and Czechia attracted even less attention. Therefore, we still lack a comprehensive conceptual understanding of judicial self--governance in both "new" and "old" EU Member States and its dynamics over time. rationales behind the rise and fall of judicial self--governance bodies 62 and about the effects of judicial self--governance. 63 One may object that the rise and fall of judicial self--governance has little bearing on the greater scheme of things, especially in comparison to attacks on constitutional courts and open assaults on the judiciary such as criminal prosecution of "recalcitrant" judges, 64 reducing the retirement age of judges, 65 or jurisdiction stripping.
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However, as I argued earlier, the recent judicial reforms in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey show that authoritarian and populist political leaders care about the control of judicial self--governance bodies and thus we should care as well. 67 Similarly, one often hears at the European level recently that it is all about the individuals and the institutional design does not matter. Yet several contributions to this special issue show that institutions actually matter. Therefore, we need to know how judicial self--governance bodies work, why they were established, what effects they have brought about, why they are challenged, and where the potential channels of politicization of the judiciary via these bodies lie. This special issue aims to fill these gaps and addresses the implications of judicial self--governance for the "new" and "old" EU member states, for Turkey, as well as for the CJEU and the ECtHR. I am aware of the pitfalls of studying governance of the two European transnational 68 courts and governance of domestic judiciaries together. 
67 See supra notes 8--10. 68 In order to avoid lengthy conceptual debate, I am using the term "transnational courts" so as to cover both the ECtHR (which is an international court) and the CJEU (which is often treated as a supranational court sui generis).
theoretically and empirically there is much to gain from comparisons between these two levels.
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Moreover, the CJEU and the ECtHR have been an integral part of the European legal space, as the current cases concerning the Polish and Hungarian judiciaries show, 71 and their governance might be used (and perhaps even misused) as a template on the domestic level. Therefore, this special issue zeroes in on judicial self--governance not only in 12 domestic European jurisdictions (Czechia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey), but also at the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Apart from the introductory article you are reading, this special issue consists of two parts: the abovementioned 14 case studies on judicial self--governance in individual jurisdictions and 5 cross--cutting articles that address common themes that have emerged from the contributions on individual jurisdictions. Each case study discusses the forms, rationales, and impact of judicial self--governance in a given jurisdiction. The horizontal articles analyze the role of court presidents, selection of judges, the specifics of judicial self--governance of international courts, the motivation of individual judges and how they act as a group, and the impact of establishment of a judicial council on public confidence in courts.
In what follows you will find a brief summary of each contribution, but I invite you to read all of the articles themselves, as I sincerely believe that in order to understand how the judiciary operates in a particular jurisdiction one must dig more deeply into the minds of lawyers, and particularly those of legal thinkers, in those legal systems to see how each of them understands their judiciary and its place within their legal systems. Only then may we 'try to understand the other legal system[s] on [their] own terms'.
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The special issue part focusing on case studies starts with the early birds of judicial self--governance -France, Italy, and Turkey. Antoine Vauchez 73 carefully traces how judicial self--governance fares in the country where the fear of the "gouvernement des juges" has haunted the political imagination for more than two centuries. He shows that judicial 69 It is obvious that the governance of the entire judiciary raises different issues than governance of a single court (and vice versa). See Çalı & Cunningham, supra note 6; Krenn, supra note 6; Tsereteli & Smekal, supra note 52. See also Part C of this article. 70 On reflection, it would have been great to include in this special issue an article on judicial self--governance of domestic constitutional courts, which might be closer to judicial self--governance of the ECtHR and the CJEU than judicial self--governance of the general judiciary. However, it is for other researchers to fill this gap. 71 See supra note 20. 72 William Ewald, The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to "Rats", 46 AM. J OF COMP. L. 701 (1998). 73 Vauchez, supra note 35.
governance à la française aims at striking a balance between an unacceptable judicial subordination to politics and an equally unacceptable corporatism. Despite the fact that this balance changes over time, the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature has so far not managed to erode the historical duopole mode of judicial governance relying on senior magistrates and high civil servants from the Chancellerie (the Ministry of Justice). Simone Benvenuti and Davide Paris 74 show how the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, arguably the best Italian institutional export product, operates in its original setting. They argue that the success of the Italian judicial council model has depended on many endogenous and exogenous factors. In fact, it took 15 years to free the appointment of judges from the influence of the Ministry of Justice, and more than three decades to loosen the grip of senior judges and improve the internal independence of Italian judges. However, this came at the price of creating another potentially dangerous body - judicial associations (the so--called correnti) who now play an unprecedented role in Italian judicial governance. Başak Çalı and Betül Durmuş 75 provide a fascinating account of the development of judicial self--governance in Turkey, which experimented with diverse forms of judicial governance ranging from no judicial self--governance, a co--option judicial council model, a hierarchical judicial council model, the executive controlled judicial council model and a pluralist judicial council model. All of these changes were driven by domestic causes and should be seen as a part of a larger trajectory of constitutional politics, marked by contestation with regard to the appropriate role of the judiciary in the Turkish political context. This difference of opinion deepened after the gradual entrenchment of a competitive authoritarian form of governance under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and reached its climax after the failed coup attempt in 2016. As a direct response to the failed coup, the AKP not only curbed judicial self--governance, but also purged one quarter of the judiciary on the grounds that they had links to the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization. Most Central and Eastern European countries established high councils for the judiciary during the accession process to the European Union. Both Slovakia and Romania are prime examples that closely followed the Euro--Model of judicial council, advocated by the European Commission and the Council of Europe. However, each of these two countries has struggled to cope with the new model. Bianca Selejan--Guțan 76 explains that the with all the accompanying negative effects such as the lack of transparency and minimal accountability. Yet she argues provocatively that, given the high level of corruption that plagues Romanian society and the culture of obedience within the Romanian judiciary, this is a "lesser evil". Samuel Spáč, Katarína Šipulová, and Marína Urbániková 77 provide a more skeptical picture about the Slovak judicial self--governance as they conclude that, with the help of politicians, the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic was hijacked by judges who used their powers to capture the judiciary from inside. These judges have used their powers in such a manner that helped them to protect their interests. Yet the increasing transparency of the Slovak judicial governance shows signs of hope. argues that judicial independence and judicial self--governance in Ireland depend on the support of politicians and a culture of mutual respect. If personal relationships break down (as they did between 2011 and 2013), essential relationships between government and the judiciary can be difficult to operate. He also shows that politicians as well as court presidents value the potential for patronage involved in judicial appointments and thus have been unwilling to relinquish control in that area. He concludes that to understand the recent debates about the Judicial Appointments Commission and the Judicial Council, getting the politics right is a key. Matej Avbelj 82 exposes the significant gap between the Slovenian judicial self--governance in the books and the way it is conducted in practice. He demonstrates how the remnants of the communist totalitarian past and the dense formal and informal networks in a relatively small Slovenian legal and political community have been used to manipulate the legal system of judicial self--governance so as to detract from rather than to contribute to the values associated with the judiciary in a well--functioning constitutional democracy. The remaining two domestic jurisdictions represent the "black sheep" that have so far resisted the introduction of any form of a judicial council. Contrary to general wisdom, both Germany and Czechia show a significant dose of judicial self--governance. Fabian Wittreck 83 rebuts the myth that Germany is a persistent objector to judicial self--governance. In fact, German court administration features as many as eight judicial self--governance bodies. These bodies range from Presidia, councils of judges (Richterräte), two judicial appointment committees and court presidents to service courts, penal courts, and civil courts deciding on the civil liability of judges. Germany thus advances a different conception of judicial self--governance, which reflects the prevailing German understanding of democratic legitimacy and separation of powers. show that the scope of judicial self--governance at the ECtHR is highly variable. While judicial self--governance at the point of judicial selection is at best 'embryonic', since this process continues to favor the primacy of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, sitting ECtHR judges, once elected, enjoy unbounded powers with respect to the management of the ECtHR's judicial activities. In particular, the President of the Court as well as Section Presidents, alongside the Jurisconsult and the Registry, exercise judicial self--governance in managing the Court's work and giving it jurisprudential direction. Başak and Stewart's central argument is twofold. First, in terms of values, they suggest that the current practices of judicial self--governance at the ECtHR are better at promoting legitimacy and judicial independence but far weaker on transparency and accountability. Second, the differences in reach and form of judicial self--governance at the pre-- and post--election processes strike a careful balance in respecting the separation of powers and the democratic principle, but this balance should not be taken for granted. Christoph Krenn 86 then traces the development of the governance model of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which builds heavily on the International Court of Justice template. He argues that this has led to communal judicial self--governance, which has fostered professionalism and strengthened the loyalty of the CJEU's judges and advocates general towards the institution. However, two challenges to this governance loom largethe growth of the CJEU (and especially the effective inclusion of the General Court in the CJEU's governance structure) and the CJEU's controversial active participation in the EU's legislative process. After these rich case studies on judicial self--governance in particular jurisdictions, this special issue picks up important horizontal issues that run through most of the contributions. extent court presidents may exploit their powers in practice. Based on these insights they also question the widely held opinion that the Western and the Eastern Europe view the roles of court presidents differently. In fact, powers of court presidents diverge significantly both within the Western Europe and within the Eastern Europe, and hence it is difficult to draw the easy line along the West/East axis on this ground. Samuel Spáč 88 focuses on the selection of judges in the age of judicial self--governance and tracks down the increasing involvement of judges in selecting their peers. To explain the latter phenomenon he suggests viewing the process of recruiting judges as a funnel, which consists of four stages, where candidates are gradually eliminated until only one or a few remain. Then he argues that in order to analyze judicial recruitment and its consequences we need not only to understand the formal rules and identify the actors involved in the process, but also to study their preferences and pay attention to the stages of the process in which they shape the recruitment. Only then can we reveal the real influence of judicial self--governance on the composition of the domestic bench. Marína Urbániková and Katarína Šipulová 89 draw a novel concept map of factors influencing public confidence in the judiciary and offer a unique view on the relationship between judicial councils and the level of public confidence in courts on their own. They raise doubts about the ability of judicial councils to enhance confidence in courts, since the EU countries without judicial councils are better off in terms of public confidence. More specifically, they conclude that the existence of judicial councils does not make a difference regarding public confidence in the judiciary in the new EU member states, while in the old EU member states judicial systems with judicial councils enjoy lower levels of public confidence than the ones without them. This does not necessarily mean that the existence of a judicial council is to be blamed for lower public confidence. Instead, the authors argue that judicial councils have only limited power to deal with the structural causes of low public confidence in courts, which often has deeper cultural and societal roots. The remaining two articles focus on international courts. Hubert Smekal and Nino Tsereteli 90 draw attention to judicial self--governance at the international level and provide a unique analysis of the selection, promotion, and removal of judges of as many as 24 international courts. They show that while judicial self--governance manifests itself relatively strongly in the promotion and removal of international judges, it is limited in 88 Spáč, supra note 51. their selection. However, sitting judges of some international courts have become increasingly involved in the expert bodies that decide or advise on selecting new judges, and thus we can witness the gradual rise of judicial self--governance even in this area. Finally, Shai Dothan 91 moves from the institutional design issues to the actual behavior of judges on the international bench. He shows that the states' influence on the selection of international judges raises the concern that judges are biased in favor of their home states. He argues that this concern cannot be refuted merely by the fact that the international courts usually sit in large and diverse panels, since judges may start forming coalitions among themselves, giving judges with national biases a practical opportunity to change the results of cases. Building on insights from the judicial behavior literature he analyzes how international judges act together as a group and eventually concludes that one way of limiting the national bias of international judges is to increase judicial self--governance (e.g. by allowing judges or presidents of international courts to have greater influence on the appointment of their future peers).
C. Forms of Judicial Self--Governance
Based on the insights from the contributions to this special issue, this Part problematizes the forms of judicial self--governance in Europe. More specifically, it argues that it is high time to look beyond judicial councils and study and to view judicial self--governance as a much more complex network of actors and bodies with different levels of participation of judges. This requires focusing on de facto judicial self--governance, the identification of other actors within the judiciary who may engage in judicial governance (such as judicial appointments commissions, promotion committees, and court presidents), taking into account the liquid nature of judicial self--governance, and acknowledgment of the fact that the rise of judicial self--governance may lead to political contestation and the creation of new channels of politicization of the judiciary. Subsequently, it identifies dimensions of judicial self--governance that should allow us to see judicial self--governance more sharply in future. I. From Judicial Councils to Judicial Self--Governance Bodies As mentioned above, the existing literature on judicial self--governance suffers from several limits. First, it focuses predominantly on judicial councils and neglects other forms of judicial self--governance such as the Courts Service bodies.
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A related problem is that there is too much emphasis on judicial self--governance bodies operating at national level. Virtually all contributions to this special issue show that we also need to look at judicial self--governance bodies operating at each court such as court presidents, 94 The other drawbacks are also well known. Most of the literature written in English 104 focuses on judicial councils in Central and Eastern Europe, which frames the debate and gives it (owing to the specifics of post--communist judiciaries) a peculiar shape. Moreover, a significant part of the policy guidelines and scholarship on judicial self--governance suffers from normative bias, as many scholars and policymakers have presumed that the rise of judicial self--governance is a one--way path and an unquestionable good. However, the developments in Hungary (where Viktor Orbán created the brand new National Office for the Judiciary, chaired by his loyal supporter Tünde Handó, and hollowed out the powers of the existing the National Judicial Council This brings us to the final limit of the existing literature, which is the static view of judicial self--governance. Even if we leave aside Poland, where one judicial reform follows the other, virtually every contribution to this special issue shows that judicial self--governance has developed over time. Some countries even modified judicial self--governance back and forth several times. In order to avoid these drawbacks, this special issue deliberately adopts a broad definition of judicial self--governance. For its purposes, "judicial self--governance body" is a body with at least one judge whose primary function, entrenched in a legal norm, is to (a) decide about issues regarding court administration and/or the career of a judge, and/or (b) advise those who decide about such issues. gives a more accurate picture of the degree of judicial self--governance in each jurisdiction than the traditional focus on judicial councils. In fact, it makes clear that judicial self--governance cannot be conflated with judicial councils (and vice versa). Second, it exposes personal overlaps between various judicial self--governance bodies. For instance, court presidents are themselves judicial self--governance bodies, but they may often also sit on judicial councils or selection and promotion committees. This "judicial self--governance nesting" cannot be addressed here, but should be the subject of future research. Third, it allows us to see the actual role of judges in the governance of the judiciary rather than the role assigned to them on paper. In fact, it fully exposes that the reality defies traditional models of court administration. For instance, Başak Çalı and Betül Durmuş show that the Ministry of Justice (1971--2010) and later on the Presidential administration (2017--now) can be dominant even under the judicial council model. 109 Similarly, a theoretically strong Slovenian judicial council is rather weak and the real decisions regarding judicial governance are made elsewhere. 110 Conversely, German and Czech contributions rebut the myth that Czechia and Germany are persistent objectors to judicial self--governance. In fact, Czech as well as German judges, each group in its own way, have been very influential in governing the judiciary, despite the nominally prevailing Ministry of Justice model. German judges sit on eight judicial self--governance bodies that have significant say in the appointment and promotion of judges, case assignment, the disciplining of judges as well as in many other issues of judicial governance.
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The Czech version of judicial self--governance is more fragile since it relies primarily on Czech court presidents, who managed to erode the role of the Ministry of Justice and became key players in court administration.
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Contrary to general wisdom, judicial self--governance can actually be practiced at the Ministry of Justice. For instance, the most powerful public servants within the Austrian Ministry of Justice (so called "Sektionschefs", heads of large departments within the Ministry of Justice) are actually judges temporarily assigned to the Ministry of Justice. Other contributions also expose gaps between de iure and de facto judicial self--governance. In Slovakia, the constitutional design of its judicial council supposes a parity of judges elected by their peers with non--judicial members appointed/elected by political actors, but in practice judges have always had a majority on the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic, since political actors decided to nominate judges as their candidates. 114 Among the many repercussions of this development are the collision between "political" judicial members and "judicial" judicial members on the judicial council and the gradual rise of judicial associations. Due to our broad definition, even judicial self--governance at the CJEU and the ECtHR can be seen in a different light. If we go beyond the Article 255 Panel and take into account the role of the CJEU's president, who is one of the strongest court presidents in Europe, 115 the significant financial 116 and administrative 117 autonomy of the CJEU, and a de facto legislative role in regulating its own affairs, 118 then we realize that this is not just "some embryonic form" of judicial self--government" 119 or a "subtle move" in the direction of judicial self--governance.
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It is rather a different type of judicial self--governance than the one we associate with judicial councils. Similarly, the ECtHR has relatively weak levels of judicial influence on the selection of judges, it enjoys a high degree of control over court administration, 121 and the ECtHR's President also wields significant powers, albeit not as strong as his CJEU counterpart. 122 These findings confirm that judicial self--governance is a far more complex phenomenon than judicial councils and there might be significant dissonance between de iure and de 114 See Spáč, Šipulová & Urbániková, supra note 31. 115 Blisa & Kosař, supra note 53. 116 
But see Christoph Krenn, The European Court of Justice's Financial Accountability. How the European Parliament Incites and Monitors Judicial Reform through the Budgetary Process, 13 EUROPEAN CONST. LAW R., 253 (2017) (who argues that the European Parliament checks for CJEU's mismanagement and gives political guidance on broader issues of CJEU's administration through the EU's budgetary process).
117 See Krenn, supra note 6. 118 On the regulatory self--governance of the CJEU, see Part C.II below. 119 Alemanno, supra note 55. facto judicial self--governance. It goes without saying that de facto judicial self--governance matters more, but in order to know more about it we need to go beyond the de iure composition and formal powers of judicial self--governance bodies. To be sure, it is important to know whether judges have a majority, 123 parity 124 or minority 125 in judicial councils and other collective judicial self--governance bodies, and who nominates the other members. However, it is also necessary to ask further and examine other factors that shape judicial self--governance bodies: who are the "other members" of these bodies, who selects the judicial members and from which echelons of the judiciary do these judges come, who presides over judicial self--governance bodies, what tiers of the judiciary we are talking about, and what are their informal relations. For instance, judges and prosecutors are indistinguishable in France, Italy, Romania, and Turkey, but there is a world of difference between them and the roles of court prosecutors in these countries. 126 Polish, Spanish, and Turkish contributions show that when politicians can select the judicial members of judicial councils, that inevitably leads to the politicization of the judiciary, 127 or at least to the perception of "distance" between judges and the judicial council. 128 However, even if judges can elect their representatives, that does not mean that political ties do not matter. In France and Italy, judicial associations, often associated with a certain political party or at least a certain worldview, actually have a major say on who sits on judicial self--governance bodies and how these bodies decide important issues.
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Slovakia then serves as a cautionary tale, as it shows that the judicial council can also be captured from inside by one of the factions within the judiciary. 123 See e.g. judicial councils in Italy, Romania, and de facto also in Slovakia. 124 See e.g. judicial councils in the Netherlands (however, the judicial member who is the president of the Dutch judicial council has a casting vote) and de iure also in Slovakia. One may object that this is due to the peculiar personal characteristic of the Slovak Chief Justice, Štefan Harabin. However, the recent Grand Chamber judgment of the ECtHR in Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v Portugal fully reveals that this is actually a structural problem. 137 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that several countries have divided these two roles and vested the judicial council chairmanship in someone other than the Chief Justice.
speak of hierarchical and non--hierarchical judicial self--governance bodies, 142 depending on the composition of the "judicial element" of these bodies. Finally, it is important to know over which tiers of the judiciary each judicial self--governing body rules. For instance, while in some countries judicial councils decide on matters of judicial governance at all tiers of the judiciary, 143 in other jurisdictions a judicial council has no say over issues concerning the Supreme Court. 144 This wide variety of judicial self--governance bodies in Europe, in terms of both their composition and their powers, is actually consequential and can guide our debates on constitutional resilience. 145 The standard approach to constitutional resilience of the judiciary vis--à--vis political attacks, prompted primarily by the events involving the judiciary in Hungary and Poland, is to increase and entrench judicial self--governance. Based on the insights from the contributions to this special issue, I would like to caution against such rosy view of judicial self--governance. First, in terms of competences, the rule of thumb is that the more power a given judicial self--governance body has, the more attention it attracts from politicians. Politicians usually do not care about Judicial Academies or less influential judicial self--governance bodies such as judicial boards in Czechia or the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board in Ireland. These bodies often operate below their radar. However, politicians care about strong judicial councils and powerful court presidents. As a result, the diffusion of powers in the area of judicial governance among different bodies, perhaps even with a different composition, might be a better solution than the creation of the strong judicial council, which concentrates virtually all powers into one institution, because the former solution is more resistant to capture. Second, the creation of the judicial self--governance body does not make the power disappear or the dangers evaporate. Power is just transferred to other hands and new channels of politicization of the judiciary are created. jurisdiction to another. The Slovak judiciary was politicized through the dominant role of the Chief Justice in the judicial council.
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The Polish judiciary has recently been politicized not only by the Minister of Justice, but also through court presidents and the new members of the National Council of the Judiciary elected by the parliamentary majority. 148 In France and Italy, the major channels of politicization of the judiciary are arguably not the non--judicial members of their judicial councils, but judicial associations.
149
In Germany, the main channel of politicization are the promotion committees.
150
In Hungary, the major channel of politicization of the judiciary is the new National Office for the Judiciary.
151
In Spain and Turkey, politicization of the judiciary has flourished due to the (s)election of judicial members of the judicial council by political branches. The difference is that while the Spanish judicial council has been captured by political parties, 152 in Turkey it is the presidential administration that currently has the major grip over the judicial council.
153
In Ukraine, the main threat arguably comes from prosecutors who sit on the judicial council.
154
Prosecutors have a strong position also in the Romanian judicial system.
155
In fact, tinkering with their independence could be more attractive than trying to influence judges, simply because the latter would arouse a lot more opposition. 156 Third, the Slovak case study shows that judicial councils can be captured not only from the outside, but also from the inside. politicians always find some judges who are willing to cooperate with them, no matter how obvious the intentions of the judicial reform are.
158
As I argued elsewhere, the wide role of the Ministry of Justice in judicial governance may sometimes be a lesser evil, since it is the "the devil we know", Minister's abuses are more visible, and it is easier to mobilize people against them. 159 Finally, one should not forget informal networks that may capture judicial self--governance bodies. While Tünde Handó's proximity to Viktor Orbán is well--known, 160 to uncover such informal relations in other jurisdictions might be extremely difficult, yet crucial. For instance, in Slovenia one can hardly assess the functioning of the judicial council without knowing the dense web of informal networks that made important decisions outside the judicial council.
161
In France, Italy, and Spain it is crucial to know who belongs to which judicial association.
162
In Czechia court presidents created several informal groups that have a major say in key areas of judicial governance. 163 Shai Dothan shows that informal coalitions may emerge also among judges of the ECtHR.
164
Samuel Spáč then carefully analyzes how informal networks may affect different stages of recruitment of judges. 165 Fortunately, recent scholarship has made significant progress in conceptualizing and analyzing such informal networks 166 and it is high time to apply these insights to European judiciaries as well.
158 See Śledzińska--Simon, supra note 7.
159 See Kosař, supra note 52. Note that Hungarian judges often refer to the period between 1990 and 1996, when the court administration was the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice as to the "golden era" (https://budapestbeacon.com/two--hungarian--law--school--professors--discuss--hungarys--deteriorating--political--and--legal--culture/?_sf_s=fleck) 160 See supra note 105. 161 See Avbelj, supra note 41. 
II. From Judicial Self--Governance Bodies to Judicial Self--Governance
Most judicial self--governance studies focus on the bodies involved in judicial self--governance. This special issue follows this approach and the case studies as well as Part C.I of this article are framed around judicial self--governance bodies. However, several contributions to this special issue invite more thorough thinking about the dimensions of judicial self--governance. 167 The major advantage of this approach is that while judiical self--governance bodies either exist or do not exist (hence it is a binary variable), judicial self--governance is a matter of scale and also encompasses informal judicial actors, which in turn allows us to better analyze the extent of control judges can exercise over the judiciary. Until recently, most studies focused primarily on personal self--governance, which concerns judicial careers (namely issues of selection, promotion, and disciplining of judges) and administrative self--governance, which covers issues such as panel composition and case assignment. The rise of specialized judicial academies and involvement of judges in educating their peers (i.e. education self--governance) are also well documented. 168 Virtually every case study in this special issue discusses these dimensions as well. But some contributions go beyond that and provide interesting insights about other dimensions of judicial self--governance. For instance, the Czech and German contributions raise important issues regarding digital self--governance. Fabian Wittreck explains that the electronic file and other measures of digitization of the judiciary may profoundly change the working--place of judges.
169
Authors of the Czech case study concur. 170 However, challenges in digital self--governance may also take other forms. For instance, Czech judges have had trouble searching for information online as the Czech Ministry of Justice blocks many websites on computers in the court buildings on dubious grounds. Participation in the budget negotiation and discretion regarding the distribution of the court budgets is perhaps even more important, as budget cuts are a subtle but effective tool for shaping the judiciary, in both good 171 and bad 172 ways. Hence, financial self--167 I leave aside the abstract conceptual disputes regarding term governance. Governance, much like government, is notoriously difficult to define as it has at least four meanings in the literature: a structure, a process, a mechanism and a strategy (see David Levi--Faur, From "Big Government" to "Big Governance"?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 3--18 (David Levi--Faur, 2012)). The other contributions show that information self--governance covers a wide set of issues, and that the approach of European jurisdictions varies a lot in this respect. Therefore, this dimension of self--governance is particularly apt for further research. Moreover, in future the GDPR implementation can become a major issue as well. Judicial self--governance at the ECtHR and the CJEU also provides a novel conceptual insight as one specific dimension of judicial self--governance that is not so visible at the domestic level emerges at the supranational level -regulatory self--governance. By regulatory self--governance I mean the unique power of the ECtHR's and the CJEU's judges to determine 172 Financial pressure can be easily abused, for instance against a critical court president and "her" court. the primary rules regarding their organization (such as organization of sessions and deliberations, setting up sections and chambers, and determining case allocation) and procedure as well as to regulate matters regarding the judicial careers of their members (such as disciplining and removal of judges, election of the court presidents and section presidents etc.). 181 In contrast to domestic courts, where these primary rules are determined by the legislature (typically in the Law on Courts), at the transnational level it is the ECtHR and the CJEU themselves who play the major role in formulating the rules that govern their activities. They do so via the adoption of the court' statutes, rules of procedure, regulations, and guidelines governing the functioning of their courts and/or behavior of judges.
182
This unprecedented autonomy results from the lack of classical tripartite separation of powers at the Council of Europe 183 and a peculiar separation of powers in the European Union.
184
What is crucial for the conceptual understanding of judicial self--governance is that in some jurisdictions judges are not only granted administrative, financial and ethical self--governance, but are also vested with the power to determine the very scope of their powers in these areas. Moreover, regulatory self--governance gives transnational courts a competitive edge in judicial reform processes, for example, by proposing treaty amendments or commenting on governmental initiatives. 185 Based on these insights, I suggest unpacking judicial self--governance into smaller units. This would allow us to study in which areas judges have their say and to what extent. This is in the end more important than knowing via which body judges could influence governance. The conceptual map of judicial self--governance that follows includes 8 components: personal self--governance, administrative self--governance, financial self--governance, educational self--governance, information self--governance, ethical self--governance, digital self--governance, and regulatory self--governance. It is by no means an exhaustive list, 184 Note that the situation in the European Union is different from the Council of Europe in many aspects, as the European Commission and especially the European Parliament do play a role in shaping the CJEU, albeit by different means and less visibly than the domestic political branches. See Krenn, supra note 6; and Krenn, supra note 116. 185 
Ibid.
186 One can also think of other dimensions such as media self--governance that would, among other things, include hiring spokespersons, handling social media, and having its own channels of medialization (such as TV channels, radio channels or own journals). should be curious how such an important socio--legal phenomenon came into being and the driving force behind it. 190 Unfortunately, the rationales of JSG have been undertheorized. To be sure, the growing scholarship on judicial councils has produced several theories such as the two--wave--theory of judicial councils, the external incentives theory of judicial councils, the transnational networks theory of judicial councils, and the dormancy of domestic parliaments in introducing judicial councils in CEE. 191 However, the existing theories are limited in several ways. First, they tend to apply only to judicial councils. Second, they are developed against the backdrop of experiences in Central and Eastern Europe, which has a peculiar historical and political trajectory. In contrast, judicial self--governance in Western Europe as well as at both European supranational courts has escaped theorizing so far. Third, the existing theories tend to treat the rise of judicial self--governance as a one--way path (with occasional bumps on the road) and overlook the possibility of counterreforms, pushback, backlash, and even rejection of judicial self--governance and the return to the previous "executive mode" of judicial governance. Fourth, these theories usually focus on why judicial self--governance is introduced, but less on why it is modified or even removed. For instance, Daniela Piana has developed a "two--wave--theory" of judicial councils that builds on the distinction between the two waves of judicial reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: the "transition wave" that took place immediately after the democratic revolution (i.e. between 1989 and 1997), and the "pre--accession" wave that covered reforms adopted during the pre--accession period (i.e. between 1998 and 2006). Piana argues that those actors who emerged as winners from the first wave of reforms (the Ministry of Justice or the judicial council) were better placed in the second wave and exploited the opportunities provided by the European Union to entrench existing domestic allocations of power. 192 Other scholars have stressed the role of external incentives such as EU Accession conditionalities (external incentives theory of judicial councils), the role of the transnational "epistemic communities" of judges, scholars, and legal experts (transnational networks theory of judicial councils) 193 or the dormancy of domestic parliaments 194 in introducing judicial self--governance in Central and Eastern Europe. Even if we limit our analysis to rationales of judicial councils in Central and Eastern Europe, we can see the limits of these predictive theories. Czechia actually defies all four theories. When we look at recent developments in Hungary and Poland, it is clear that there is a third wave, and the two--wave theory should be modified accordingly. Likewise, domestic parliaments are no longer dormant, and the role of external incentives for Central and Eastern European countries do not play as significant a role as originally thought. 195 The case studies in this special issue do not provide any grand theories. They provide a more sober assessment of rationales of why judicial self--governance bodies came into being. In most countries the major rationale behind the introduction of new judicial self--governing bodies was to protect judicial independence and guarantee separation of powers.
196
Only in few countries, the establishment of major judicial self--governance bodies was motivated by improving other values such as judicial accountability or effectiveness of the judiciary. 197 However, that does not mean that politics do not play a role in shaping JSG. On the contrary, virtually all case studies show that the foundations of judicial self--governance are political. In many countries, judicial councils were established in the wake of authoritarian 198 and totalitarian regimes.
199
Başak Çalı and Betül Durmuş show that the development of judicial self--governance in Turkey has also been a response to changing political conditions.
200
In Ireland, political crises also serve as the main driving force of judicial reforms touching upon judicial self--governance. The French and Italian case studies then show how judicial self--governance in these countries has been shaped by high--profile judicial scandals. 195 Or more precisely, these external incentives are of a short--term nature. Once the CEE country joins the EU, the incentives for CEE countries to keep judicial self--governing bodies meeting the EU standards are much weaker.
been driven by political demands to improve the management of the Dutch courts and increasing the efficiency of the judiciary. Politics was also behind the creation of the expert panels at the ECtHR and the CJEU, as both of them responded to the enlargement of the respective Court and to the need to screen newly arriving judges from Central and Eastern Europe.
202
Politics also help to explain the resistance to judicial councils in Germany and Czechia. On the basis of both case studies 203 one may of course argue that judicial councils are not needed, as there is enough judicial self--governance anyway. 204 However, in Czechia the rise of court presidents, the key judicial self--governance body, also has political roots. This results from the high turnover of Czech ministers of justice, the Ministry's personal misery, and the gradual overall demise of the influence and gravitas of the Ministry of Justice in the Czech political system. Germany's resistance to judicial councils is based on a peculiar understanding of the principles of democracy and separation of powers, which is deeply embedded among the traditional German political parties. 206 The German judiciary has been afraid that with unknown political parties coming to power their independence might be in danger, and that might be the reason why some judges regard the concept of judicial self--government as tempting. 207 Hailbronner, supra note 66. 208 Ibid.
between various forms of resistance to judicial self--governance. Here the conceptualization of resistance to international courts, which distinguishes between backlash, pushback, and withdrawal (exit), is particularly helpful.
220
While the French change of the composition of the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature in 2008 implies pushback, 221 the significant institutional reforms in Hungary (in 2011), Poland (in 2017), and Turkey (in 2017) qualify as a backlash against judicial self--governance. 222 And if Polish political leaders implement their threat to return to the Ministry of Justice model of judicial governance and abolish the National Council of the Judiciary altogether, such reform would fall into the category of exit from judicial self--governance. Finally, we also need to learn more about the reasons behind the fall of judicial self--governance in Central and Eastern Europe and the motivations of the politicians who executed it. A careful analysis of the Polish scenario by Anna Śledzińska--Simon is a promising start of this endeavor. 223 
E. Effects of Judicial Self--Governance
Analyzing the effects of judicial self--governance is a daunting task for at least three reasons. It is extremely difficult to isolate these effects from other social, political, economic, judicial, and historical factors even if one compares two countries that are closest to the natural experiment we can get. 224 Just think of the political turmoil in Poland and Romania or the changing role of the presidency in Turkey, all of which have had serious repercussions for their respective judicial councils. Sometimes even unique events such as the failed coup d'état in Turkey can make a difference. 225 In social science terminology, there are simply too many independent variables. Hence, do not expect any causal claims or predictive theories here. Second, even if we agree on the effects on what values we want to focus on, the dependent variables defy easy definitions. As the readers of this journal know very well, we are not even close to generally accepted definitions of key values such as judicial independence and judicial accountability, not to speak of 220 See Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Weibuch, Backlash Against International Courts: Explaining the confidence in and transparency and legitimacy of the judiciary. Third, many values are actually interdependent and thus cannot be easily disentangled. An article on the impact of the establishment of the judicial council on public confidence in courts exemplifies all these issue. Marína Urbániková and Katarína Šipulová grapple with the conceptual disagreement regarding public confidence and define its three levels (individual, institutional and cultural), painstakingly identify the factors that may influence public confidence in the judiciary, and acknowledge that the establishment and reforms of judicial councils usually relate public confidence to some other value: most frequently these are independence (Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Hungary, Ireland), accountability (Netherlands), and the perception of the effectiveness of the judicial system (Netherlands, Poland, Hungary, France, Ireland).
226
Only then can they study the effects of judicial councils on public confidence. They are careful not to make any causal claims, but their findings provide a lot of food for thought as they show that the EU countries without judicial councils are in general better off in terms of public confidence. More specifically, they conclude that the existence of judicial councils does not make a difference regarding public confidence in the judiciary in the new EU member states, while in the old EU member states judicial systems with judicial councils enjoy lower levels of public confidence than the ones without them. 227 In other words, the ability of judicial councils to enhance confidence in courts is limited. This does not necessarily mean that the existence of a judicial council is to be blamed for lower public confidence. They merely argue that judicial councils have only limited power to deal with the structural causes of low public confidence in courts, which often has deeper cultural and societal roots Marína Urbániková and Katarína Šipulová also summarize the impact of judicial councils on judicial independence, which is closely related to public confidence in courts. 228 In Romania, according Selejan--Guțan, the judicial council "was not sufficient for protecting the true independence of the judiciary".
229
Regarding Slovenia, Matej Avbelj concludes that the judicial council has had a limited impact on independence, and there have even been cases in which its (in)action negatively affected it.
230
Slovakia serves as a cautionary tale regarding the impact of the establishment of the judicial council on judicial independence. 226 See Šipulová & Urbániková, supra note 89. 227 Ibid. 228 
Ibid.
229 Selejan--Guțan, supra note 14. 230 Avbelj, supra note 41.
While the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic arguably increased the institutional independence of the judiciary, it failed to secure the independence of individual judges. 231 In fact, Slovak judges faced more reprisals from their colleagues who captured the judicial council than from the Minister of Justice before the introduction of the judicial council. 232 Judicial councils in Spain and Turkey also failed to deliver judicial independence. Aida Torres Pérez argues that in Spain the judicial council has been captured by politicians, which in turn prevents it "from fulfilling its goal and has contributed to undermining public confidence in the judiciary as a whole". 233 This in line with the empirical data that show that a shocking 36 % of Spanish judges think that the Spanish Consejo General del Poder Judicial disrespect their independence. 234 In Turkey, according to Çalı and Durmuş, it has been "suspect, whether the different forms of JSG have promoted judicial independence, given the highly politicized conditions that led to many of the JSG reforms". 235 Judicial councils in France, Italy, and Poland show mixed results. Although they helped to secure independence, other problems arose. Vauchez concludes that even though the judicial council in France "has undoubtedly gained competences and institutional autonomy, it remains firmly embedded in a dense web of links and dependences that secure its integration within the body of the State". 236 Similarly, Benvenuti and Paris claim that in Italy the High Council of the Judiciary played a crucial role in securing the independence of the judiciary from the executive power, but this does not apply to internal independence.
237
Finally, the Polish case is a sad story. Śledzińska--Simon shows that the Polish Judicial Council in general succeeded as a guarantor of independence, but it did not prevent the Law and Justice regime from pushing through its 2017 judicial reform, which allowed it to pack the judicial council with its protégés and turn it against "recalcitrant" judges.
In countries without judicial councils or the court service, this assessment is also complex. Fabian Wittreck shows that German ministers rarely endangered individual judicial independence, while judicial self--government bodies, such as presidia and court presidents, have in some cases infringed the rights of individual judges. 239 According to him, "[t]he mechanisms of [judicial] self--government merely shift the dangers for individual judicial independence by shifting power". 240 At the moment, the major danger in Germany lies in promotion of judges. 241 In Czechia court presidents evolved into guardians against executive interferences with judicial independence, but due to the absence of sufficient safeguards they also present a threat to the independence of rank--and--file judges. 242 The "buffer" between court presidents and rank--and--file judges, which in Germany is represented in particular by presidia and service courts, simply does not exist in Czechia. We know much less about the impact of judicial self--governance on other values. Regarding legitimacy, strong judicial self--governance bodies insulated from the elected branches of government inevitably reduce the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary.
Information about the impact of judicial self--governance bodies on judicial accountability is also scarce, and thus it is difficult to deduce a clear pattern. This is again partly due to the significant disagreement among European scholars, judges, and policymakers regarding the concept of judicial accountability itself. 247 With this huge caveat in mind, we can still see that the majority of contributions do not support the view that judicial self--governance bodies increase judicial accountability. Some case studies suggest the contrary. Regarding Italy, Benvenuti and Slovakia then serves as a cautionary tale since the Slovak judicial elite, and especially Chief Justice Harabin, abused accountability mechanisms in order to reward his allies (through salary bonuses and promotion) and to punish their critics (via disciplinary motions). 250 The assessment of the impact of judicial self--governance on accountability is even more difficult at the supranational level. Christoph Krenn argues that the individual accountability of CJEU members is regulated in--house, while the institutional accountability is secured primarily by the European Parliament through the EU's budgetary process.
251
Accountability is even more limited at the Strasbourg Court, on both the institutional and individual levels. clearly prioritize judicial independence at the expense of accountability, 253 which fully accords with the institutional setup and the "judicial trilemma" theory of the ECtHR. 254 Finally, regarding the impact of judicial self--governance on the transparency of the judiciary, case studies in this special issue provide much richer information. 255 Here, some judicial self--governance bodies fare particularly well. In Spain, "the Council has labored to provide the public with broad, easily available information and promote increased transparency regarding judicial activities", including a special Website on Transparency. 256 Regarding Ireland, O'Brien argues that the Courts Service "ha[s] increased the transparency of the courts system through the Courts Service website and annual reports. It is possible that these changes have played a small role in enhancing public trust and improving the legitimacy of judges and the courts." 257 In Slovakia, the establishment of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic in 2003 led to a major improvement in the transparency of the Slovak judiciary, but the key transparency reform was adopted by the Slovak parliament in 2011, among other things, due to the opaque decision--making processes at the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic. 258 Hence, judicial councils can improve transparency both directly and indirectly, and sometimes even their negative view of judicial transparency may prompt legislative reform. In contrast, Fabian Wittreck argues that "mechanisms of self--government have only a marginal effect on the (lacking) transparency of the [German] judiciary", because their outputs are too technical. 259 This suggests that in studying transparency we should care not only about the accessibility of data about the judiciary and their findability (how easily these data can be located), but also about their understandability (e.g. their user--friendly format). Future research on judicial transparency should inquire into "the degree to which
